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JURISDICTION
This Court's jurisdiction over this appeal arises
from Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c)(1986).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal of right from the trial court's
Findings of Fact and Order Denying Certificate of Probable Cause
and Release Pending Appeal and from the trial court's failure
to permit appellant to withdraw his guilty plea in accordance
with State v. Kay, 29 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986).
Although the issue of probable cause and release
pending appeal was remanded by the Utah Supreme Court to the
lower court for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
lower court in attempt to comply therewith still did not comply
because such labeled findings and conclusions merely restated
the lower court's general denial of such motions.
As substantiated in transcripts on file herein, initial
defense counsel Payton clearly stated appellant's position
relative to his right to withdraw his guilty plea if the trial
judge indicated his refusal to accept the terms of the plea
bargain.
Below are references to various transcripts in support
hereof:
1.

J a n u a r y 2 3 , 1986:
T . 5 , 6.

2.

March 10, 1986:
T . 1 2 , 14, 15, 16.
-1-

3.

March 17, 1986:
T. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27,
34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39.

4.

April 14, 1986:
T. 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,
48, 49, 50.

5.

June 11, 1986:
T. 53, 54, 55, 58.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

A Rule 11 error in the instant case results in

a substantial violation of appellantfs rights.
2.

The petition for certificate of probable cause

filed by appellant1s counsel is not plainly frivolous and presents
at least one issue which is novel or fairly debatable and is
integral to the conviction.
3.

Appellant should be released from custody

pending appeal, with or without bond, because he is not likely
to flee the jurisdiction nor will the community be threatened
by his release.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An Information was filed July 9, 1985, in the Sixth
Circuit Court, State of Utah, Tooele County, Tooele Department,
and Summons served, charging the appellant with the crime of
Sexual Abuse of a Child, a felony in the second degree, in
violation of U.C.A., 1953, §76-5-404.1.
The appellant was accused of having inserted his finger
in the vagina of a seven-year-old girl while giving her a ride
-2-

on his motorcycle.
The appellant maintains his innocence, but did file
the usual affidavit concerning plea bargain agreements.
In exchange for the appellant pleading guilty as
charged, the prosecution agreed to recommend probation, not
oppose reducing the charge to a third degree felony upon
successful completion of probation, and no other charges known
to the prosecution would be filed against the appellant involving
the same alleged victim.
On March 10, 1986, the appellant appeared before the
lower court for sentencing.

At that time, the lower court

indicated that after reading the presentence report it was going
to reject the plea bargain agreement and was going to sentence
the appellant to prison.
The appellant objected to the lower court!s indication
and the matter was continued to March 17, 1986.
On March 17, 1986, the lower court entered its order
for a 90-day evaluation at St. Mark's.
Counsel for appellant objected to this procedure and
maintained that, if the lower court would not accept the plea
bargain agreement, the appellant should be allowed to withdraw
his plea pursuant to Rule 11(f) (U.C.A. , 1953, §77-35-11 (.f)) .
The lower court indicated that the appellant could at
any time before final judgment file a Memorandum of Authority
to withdraw his guilty plea and that the appellant would be
-3-

returned to the lower court June 9, 1986, for further proceedings.
From the date of the Information and Summons, July 9,
1985, until his surrendering himself to St. Mark's, March 18,
1986, the appellant had been released on his own recognizance
on the condition he stay away from the alleged victim or her
mother.

This condition has never been violated.
At St. Mark's the appellant was told that he would

have to admit to the act charged, which he refused to do, because
of his adamantly maintaining his innocence.

Also, he was told

that he would have to submit to a pie thy sinograph test to be
administered by a female.

He refused.

On April 12, 1986, because of these two refusals, St.
Mark's notified the lower court that it would not complete the
90-day evaluation.
The lower court then ordered that the appellant be
kept in custody and incarcerated in the Tooele County Jail until
sentenced.
On May 27, 1986, after reviewing appellantfs

Memorandum

of Authorities in support of the motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, without an evidentiary hearing or argument, the lower court
denied the appellant's motion.
On June 11, 1986, Phil L. Hansen appeared as counsel
with the appellant before the lower court.

When the lower court

asked if there was any legal reason why sentence should not be
imposed at that time, Mr. Hansen stated that there was.
-4-

And Mr.

Hansen renewed the appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea and be permitted to stand trial as originally charged.
The lower court again denied the motion and sentenced
the appellant to the Utah State Prison for a term of not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years.
On that very same date, June 11, 1986, counsel for the
appellant prepared the following documents to be filed with
the lower court:

Notice of Appeal; Designation of Record;

Certificate of ordering transcripts of the lower court's proceedings on January 23, 1986, March 10, 1986, March 17, 1986, May 27,
1986, and June 11, 1986; Motion for Certificate of Probable
Cause and Release on Bond Pending Appeal; and Certificate of
Probable Cause and Order for Bond and Release Pending Appeal.
Because of conflicting schedules of court and cousel
between Tooele County and Salt Lake County, it was not until
June 16, 1986, that counsel for appellant made personal contact
with the lower court.
At that time, Mr. Hansen met with the lower court while
in recess in Salt Lake County and asked if the lower court would
sign a Certificate of Probable Cause.

The reply was, "Sure."

Mr. Hansen informed the lower court that he was not
aware that Mr. Hansen and the lower court would be able to meet
at that moment.

Because of that, Mr. Hansen did not have the

documents with him but he would go to his office and return with
them.

Mr. Hansen then asked the lower court to set bond.
-5-

The reply was that the lower court did not want the appellant
on the streets and that if there was bond, it would be substantial
The same day, June 16, 1986, Mr. Hansen returned with
the documents, and the lower court asked that he leave them for
its review.
Mr. Hansen returned a few times thereafter and was
informed that the lower court had not had time to review the
documents.
Later Mr. Hansen was informed that the lower court had
denied both motions and that the documents had been mailed to
Tooele County.
On June 27, 1986, Mr. Hansen met with the lower court
in Tooele County, at which time the lower court signed its formal
order of denial, and Mr. Hansen filed the same.
On June 25, 1986, the Tooele County Clerk filed the
Notice of Appeal and the Designation of Record.
On June 27, 1986, Mr. Hansen filed the Certificate of
ordering transcripts of the lower court's proceedings on January
23, 1986; March 10, 1986; March 17, 1986; May 27, 1986; and
June 11, 1986.
This matter was brought before the Utah Supreme Court,
under Case No. 860345, for oral argument on August 11, 1986.
At said time the Utah Supreme Court remanded the matter to the
trial court for purposes of conducting a hearing to determine the
propriety of issuing a certificate of probable cause and for
-6-

purposes of making appropriate findings of fact.
A hearing on appellant1s motion for certificate of
probable cause and release on bond pending appeal was held
before the Honorable John A. Rokich, in the Third Judicial
District Court, Tooele County, State of Utah, on the 22nd day
of December, 1986.
The Utah Supreme Court assigned this case to the Utah
Court of Appeals for further proceedings on or about January 26,
1987.
The trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Order
Denying Certificate of Probable Cause on or about February 4,
1987, a copy of which is included in the Addendum to this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Although Rule 11 (f), Utah R. Crim. P. expressly

provides that a judge may decide that final disposition shall
not be handled in conformity with the plea agreement, and that
he shall so advise the defendant to either affirm or withdraw
his plea, the court may not then refuse to grant a motion to
dismiss the plea.
2.

The decision of the lower court to deny appellant's

motion to withdraw the plea is an error that affects appellant's
substantial rights as a party.
3.

As a result, the lower court's Rule 11 violation

can be a basis for invalidating appellant's plea.
4.

That appellant's petition for certificate of
-7-

probable cause presents an issue which is novel or fairly
debatable.
50

Appellant is not likely to flee the jurisdiction

nor will the community be threatened by his release.
ARGUMENT OF THE CASE
Point I
A RULE 11 ERROR IN THE INSTANT
CASE RESULTS IN A SUBSTANTIAL
VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS.
Rule 11(f), Utah R. Grim. P. dictates the role of the
judge where he or she decides that final disposition should not
be handled in conformity with the plea agreement.

Rule 11(f)

reads as follows:
(f) The judge shall not participate
in plea discussions prior to any
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative
plea agreement has been reached which
contemplates entry of a plea in the
expectation that other charges will
be dropped or dismissed, the judge,
upon request of the parties, may
permit the disclosure to him of such
tentative agreement and the reasons
therefor in advance of the time for
tender of the plea. The judge may
then indicate to the prosecuting
attorney and defense counsel whether
he will approve the proposed disposition. Thereafter, if the judge
decides that final disposition should
not be handled in conformity with the
plea agreement, he shall so advise
the defendant and then call upon the
defendant to either affirm or withdraw
his plea.
In the case at bar, the plea was disclosed to the court
-8-

after the plea agreement was reached.

The next step under

Rule 11 is clarified by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Kay,
29 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986), as follows:
[Rule 11] provides, ... that
after such an agreement is
reached, the plea may be
disclosed to the court, which
may then indicate to both
parties whether the proposed
disposition will be approved.
Id., at 33, 29 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah 1986).
Here, the trial court acted properly in this regard.
It clearly indicated that the final disposition would not be handled
in conformity with the plea.

However, according to the Court in

State v. Kay,
That portion of [Rule 11] also
provides that if the trial court
thereafter decides not to adhere
to the terms of the agreement, it
shall so advise the defendant and
allow the defendant to either
affirm or withdraw the plea.
Id., at 33, 29 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah 1986).
As stated by Justice Durham, concurring in the result
in State v. Kay:
If the court rejects the [plea]
agreement, it must allow the
defendant to withdraw the plea....
Id., at 38, citing United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325,
1339 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, although the lower court allowed
appellant to file a Memorandum of Authority to withdraw his
-9-

guilty plea, it denied appellant the opportunity to withdraw

Conduct not in conformity with Rule 11 is expressly
disfavored by the Utah Supreme Court.

In State v. Kay, it

writes:
Such participation may ...
undermine the judge!s proper
function as a neutral arbitor
and transform him into an
advocate for whatever proposed
resolution the judge favors.
Id., at 33, 29 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah 1986), citing United
States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 203 (2d Cir. 1976), cert, denied,
429 U.S. 926 (1976).
At Werker, 205, the court held:
Accordingly, we conclude that fair
and expeditious disposition of
criminal cases is best achieved by
the trial judge completely abstaining
from any participation in any discussions or communications regarding
sentence, except as provided in Rule
11 Fed. R. Crim. P.
Rule 11 states the defendant either affirm the agreement
or withdraw his plea.
in the instant case.

This is where the trial court was in error
Although the trial court allowed the

appellant to file a Memorandum of Authority to withdraw his plea,
it did not allow the appellant to withdraw his plea.
The Court in State v. Kay further emphasizes why this
conduct by the lower court, in deciding that final disposition
should not be handled in conformity with the plea agreement, did
-10-

so advise the defendant and then called upon the defendant to
either affirm or withdraw his plea.
However, Justice Durham, concurring in the result of
State v. Kay, stated:
If the court rejects the [plea]
agreement, it must allow the
defendant to withdraw the plea....
(Emphasis added.)
Appellant appeals from the trial court's refusal to
adhere to the terms of a plea bargain.

He pleaded guilty to the

crime of sexual abuse of a child, a felony of the second degree,
in violation of U.C.A., §76-5-404.1, in exchange for a promise
that the prosecution would recommend probation, not oppose
reducing the charge to a third degree felony upon successful
completion of probation, and no other charges known to the
prosecution would be filed against the appellant involving the
same alleged victim.
Point II
THE PETITION FOR CERTIFICATE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE FILED BY APPELLANT'S
COUNSEL IS NOT PLAINLY FRIVOLOUS,
AND PRESENTS AT LEAST ONE ISSUE
WHICH IS NOVEL OR FAIRLY DEBATABLE
AND IS INTEGRAL TO THE CONVICTION.
The criteria by which Utah courts will determine whether
a certificate of probable cause should be granted is set forth
in Rule 27(b) Utah R. Crim. P. (U.C.A., 1953, §77-35-27).
Rule 27(b) provides in relevant part:
A certificate of probable cause
-11-

shall be issued if the court hearing
the application deteminesT~that there
are meritorious issues that should
be decided by the appellate court.
(Emphasis added.)
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Neely, 19 Utah
Adv. Rep. 15, 707 P.2d 647 (Utah 1985) states that Rule 27(b),
Utah R. Grim. P., is patterned after the federal law prior to
the 1984 changes in the federal Bail Reform Act.

The Court

writes:
The previous federal law required
that, in order to admitted to
bail pending appeal, a defendant
must raise a substantial question
which should be determined by the
appellate court. The federal
courts have consistenly interpreted
that language to mean that bail
should be denied if the appeal is
frivolous or taken merely for delay,
but that bail should be granted
where the issues raised by the
defendant are either novel or fairly
debatable. See, e.g., D*Aquino v.
United States, 180 F.2d 271 (9th
Cir. 1950); Bridges v United
States, 184 F.2d 881 (9th Cir.
1950).
Id.
Moreover, the Court states:
We hold that under our Rule 27, in
issuing a certificate of probable
cause preliminary to consideration
of release pending appeal, the court
must determine that the issues of
fact or law raised on appeal are
substantial. There are two prongs to
the test for determining whether issues
raised are "substantial.f! First, the
-12-

question raised must be either (1)
novel, i.e. , there is no Utah precedent
that governs, or (2) fairly debatable.
A legal issue is fairly debatable if
Utah precedent bearing on the issue
presents conflicting points of view
when applied to the facts of the case
or is otherwise unclear. Second, the
legal issue raised must also be integral
to the conviction, e.g., if error in
the proceedings below would be considered
harmless, in light of precedent, the
certificate should not issue.
Id.
In the case at bar, the certificate of probable cause
filed by appellant's counsel is not plainly frivolous.
In addition, the Court in State v. Neely indicated
as follows:
In order that this court may
make an informed decision in
issuing certificates of probable
cause under Rule 27, we shall
from this date forward require
that an affidavit be filed at the
time a petition for certificate of
probable cause is filed in this
Court. The affidavit shall be
made and signed by defense counsel,
rather than the defendant, and
shall narrate the facts developed
at trial together with the following:
a statement of the crime for which
the defendant was convicted; the
sentence imposed; whether the
defendant has previously applied
to the district court for a
certificate of probable cause and,
if so, whether the issues presented
were the same as those presented to
this Court; the ruling of the district
court on the issues; and the bases
or reasons for the court's ruling.
In addition, counsel shall file a
-13-

memorandum of law in support of the
defendant5s position that the issues
to be presented on appeal are novel
or fairly debatable and are integral
to the conviction.
Id.
Appellant has, in the instant case, presented at least
one issue which is novel or fairly debatable as defined by the
Court in State v. Neely and is integral to the conviction.
The lower court's interpretation, as opposed vigorously
by appellant, in State v. Kay is most certainly fairly debatable.
Point III
APPELLANT SHOULD BE RELEASED FROM
CUSTODY PENDING APPEAL, WITH OR
WITHOUT BOND, BECAUSE HE IS NOT
LIKELY TO FLEE THE JURISDICTION
NOR WILL THE COMMUNITY BE
THREATENED BY HIS RELEASE.
Finally, as the Court in State v. Neely stated, Rule
27 provides a two-step process for defendants in seeking release
on bond pending appeal.

The Court states:

The second step, release pending
appeal, with or without bail, is
based on evidence that the
defendant is not likely to flee
the jurisdiction and that the
community will not be threatened
by his release.
Id., at 17, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah 1985), citing State v.
Pappas, 696 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1985).
The record indicates that from the date of the
Information and Summons, July 9, 1985, until his surrendering
himself to St. Mark's, March 18, 1986, the appellant had been
-14-

released on his own recognizance on the condition he stay away
from the alleged victim or her mother.

This condition has never

been violated.
CONCLUSION
For the above r e a s o n s , t h i s Court should d i r e c t an
order g r a n t i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a
and h i s motion for a C e r t i f i c a t e of Probable Cause and Release
Pending Appeal r e l a t i v e t o t h e Kay case.
In the alternative, appellant seeks dismissal of all
charges against him, with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted this

;

) >>

day of September,

1987.
HANSEN & HANSEN
800 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2467
Attorneys for Appellant
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KEITH F. OEHLER
jDeputy Tooele County Attorney
Jooele County Courthouse
47 South Main Street
Tooele, Utah 84074
Telephone: 882-5550, Ex. 351
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * * *

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs .

Criminal No,

JAMES WILLIAM HARRIS,
Defendant.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

This

matter

came

on

regularly

for

hearing

before

the

jHonorable John A. Rokich, District Court Judge, on remand from
the Utah Supreme Court.
by Phil Hansen, Esq.

Defendant was present and represented
The State was represented

Oehler, Deputy Tooele County Attorney.
now
I

evidence

by Keith F.

The Defendant offered no

or argument, except to proffer the testimony of

'Defendant and others that Defendant would not be a risk to the
community and would appear if released on b*il pending appeal.
The

State

thereto,

objected

and

to

the

proffer,

counter-proffering

the

declining
testimony

to

stipulate

of others that

Defendant would be a risk to the community if admitted to bail*
The

State

argued

Probable Cause.

against

the

issuance

of

a

Certificate

Having considered the matter and, being fully

of

-2advised in the premises, the Court hereby enters the following
findings and order:
1.

On the 23rd day of January, 1986, Defendant freely and

voluntarily entered his plea of guilty to the crime of Sexual
Abuse of a Child, a Felony of the Second Degree;
2.

Defendant entered his plea after discussing the matter

with his then counsel of record, Steven Lee Payton;
3.

Prior to entering Defendant's said plea, the terms of

the plea negotiations were disclosed to the Court; namely, that
the Tooele
probation

County
in

this

Defendant's motion

Attorney's
matter

Office
and

to reduce

to

had

had
a

agreed

agreed

Third

to

not

Degree

recommend
to

oppose

Felony

upon

successful completion of probation and that no other charge(s)
would be filed against Defendant for other crimes Defendant may
have committed

involving Genie Sue Syndergaard which were then

known to the prosecutor;
4.

The Court advised the Defendant, prior to the accept-

ance of Defendant's plea, that the Court was not bound by the
recommendations

of

the

prosecuting

attorney,

the

Defendant's

attorney, or by anyone; and Defendant acknowledged he understood
that the Court was not bound by anyone as to the sentence that
would be imposed; and Defendant signed his affidavit acknowledging that the Court was not bound as to any sentence that may be
imposed,

which

affidavit

was

then

signed

in

open

court

Defendant and his then Counsel of Record, the prosecutor, and
the Court;

by

-3-

5.

On March

17, 1986, (in Salt Lake County by stipula-

tion), Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and for
leave

of

counsel

to

withdraw

came

on

for

hearing

and were

denied; Defendant was ordered by the Court to undergo a 90-day
diagnostic evaluation pursuant to statute;
6.

On June 11, 1986, Defendant appeared, with new counsel

for sentencing; the State recommended probation for Defendant as
did Counsel of Record for Defendant; Defendant was sentenced to
the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years; Defendant's renewed motion to withdraw his plea was
also denied;
7o

Defendant's plea agreement was not conditioned upon the

granting of any particular sentence by the Court;
8.

No

part

of

Defendant's

plea

agreement

has

been

breached;
9.

The Court had taken no part in negotiating Defendant's

plea agreement;
10.

After

approached

sentencing,

Defendant's

Counsel

of

Record

the Court, ex parte , for a Certificate of Probable

Cause; the Court denied the same without hearing;
11.

On

December

22,

1986, the

Court

held

a hearing

Defendant's motion for a Certificate of Probable Cause;

on

-4Defendant relied on prior argument herein made in support of his
motions to withdraw his guilty plea; the State argued against
the granting of the certificate;
12.

There

are

no

novel

issues

presented

by

Defendants

appeal; there is ample Utah precedent that governs withdrawals
of

guilty

pleas; Utah

precedent

on

the

issue

is not

fairly

debatable and does not present conflicitng points of view when
[applied to the facts of this case;
I

13.

State v. Hanson , 627 P.2d

'cases therein

53 (Utah 1931), and the

cited, are controlling; Defendant's reliance on

State v. Kay , 29 Utah Advance Reporter 30 (1986) is misplaced;
in the present matter there was no aborted plea agreement and
there was no "guarantee" as to the sentence to be imposed by the
Court.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for
a Certificatre of Probable Cause be, and the same hereby is,
denied,

there

being

no

substantial

issue

raised

on appeal.

Having denied the issuance of the Certificate it is unnecessary
to consider the second step under Rule 27, §77-35-27, Utah Code,
Defendant's release pending appeal, as determined by our Supreme
Court in State v. Neeley , 707 P.2d

647 (1985).

therefore, expresses

this

no opinion

at

time

This Court,

concerning

the

likelihood of Defendant's fleeing the jurisdiction or the threat

-2to the community which may be presented by his release.
DATED this

day of February, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

JOHN A. ROKICH
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to Phil Hansen, Attorney for Defendant, at
800 Boston Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this .3^^ day of February, 1987..

,

Shefri Brown, Legal Secretary

77-35-11. Rule 11 - Pleas.

(f) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any agreement being made by the
prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea agreement has been reached which contemplates entry
of a plea in the expectation that other charges will
be dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon request of
the parties, may permit the disclosure to him of
such tentative agreement and the reasons therefor in
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The
judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney
and defense counsel whether he uill approve the
proposed disposition. Thereafter, if the judge
decides that final disposition should not be handled
in conformity with the plea agreement, he shall so
advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea.
ma

77-35-27. Rule 27 - Stays pending appeal.

(b) A certificate of probable cause shall be issued
if the court hearing the application determines that
there are meritorious issues that should be decided
by the appellate court. A certificate of probable
cause may be issued by the trial court or, if denied
by the trial court, by the court to whom an appeal is
taken. The application for a certificate of probable
cause shall be in writing, state the grounds for the
issuance of the certificate and shall be served upon
the prosecuting attorney. A hearing on the application for a certificate of probable cause shall be held
after notice to all parties.

